Showing posts with label admiralty jurisdiction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label admiralty jurisdiction. Show all posts

Sunday, April 26, 2015

MY VOYAGE WITH INDIAN GRACE.



                      (V.M. Syam Kumar, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)
Every branch of law has its own share of land mark judgments. They are important mile stones in the evolution of law. Teachers teach them with emphasis and students study them earnestly. The study of law of tort is thus incomplete without reading Donogue V. Stevenson. Similarly, Constitutional law cannot be taught excluding Marbury v. Madison. Students of Contract law cannot ignore Carllil v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. and Company law demands deep acquaintance with Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. They are cases which are to be chewed, eaten and digested at the law school. Maritime law too has its own fair share of land marks to offer. The House of Lords decision in MV Indian Grace is one among them.
Whatever cult status these legal land marks may have had at the law school, they are soon forgotten when we are out of the law school. The name of the case may still ring a bell, but the specifics may no longer be retained. Practice as a lawyer throws up other important legal norms of contemporary relevance to be remembered and the earlier land marks gradually fade from memory. They have only ‘academic relevance’ now. Further as most of these land marks are antiques from by gone times, they are seldom cited as authority of value since much water might have flown thereafter.  At the best, a passing reference may be made to them in a case of comparable facts or legal issues. That too only before a so called ‘academically inclined judge’, whose creed is fast vanishing.
Never in our wildest dreams do we expect to be part of the said land mark judgments or to get an opportunity to argue them out afresh. Who would expect to get to argue Donoghue V. Stevenson in the court room all over again as a lawyer for one of the parties to the dispute. We presume, and rightly so that the ginger beer consumed by Mrs. Donoghue would have long been digested with or without the snail and the smoke balls that Mrs Louisa Elizabeth Carlill had purchased to cure her aliment of flu would not survive beyond the date of the judgment in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.
Similarly, while at law school I had like all my class mates expected that MV Indian Grace would have completed her voyage long back and all legal issues involving her cargo of shells and cartridges would have been laid to rest with the House of Lords decision. We presumed that the shells and cartridges carried on board MV Indian Grace for use in the Bofors howitzer guns acquired by Indian armed forces would all have been expended on our enemies at the borders.  Dr. A.M. Varkey our professor at Law school had made each of us read through the MV Indian Grace decision over and over again to impress upon the nuances of admiralty jurisdiction and the vexing issues concerning in rem and in personam actions involved therein. Like the rest, I expected MV Indian Grace to be relevant only for what is contained in the House of Lords decision. I was utterly wrong in presuming so.
By some strange twist of fate, after enrolling as a lawyer I had to be party to the  final legal voyage of MV Indian Grace and was called upon to defend her based on those very same issues and facts about her and her cargo which I had learned by heart at the law school.  
It all started one day with a dusty and shabby case bundle which I saw resting on my table upon my return from the court. I had just shifted my practice to Kochi and had joined the law firm Southern Law Chambers. I had had a prior stint as a junior to the legendary maritime lawyer S. Venkiteswaran in the Admiralty Court of Bombay. After my return I had just started attending the firm’s work and the bundle had been placed on my table at the instructions of the Senior Partner. It carried a note that I shall study the file and be prepared to argue the case as and when it comes up for hearing. It was clear that the green horn from Bombay with a Masters degree in Maritime law and bearing the tag of being the junior to the best maritime lawyer in India was being put to test. I carried the file home for study and slept over. Early morning next day, I proceeded to open it up and the contents revealed a suit filed by Government of India to recover some amounts from a company by the name M/s. India Steam Ship Company purportedly towards damages for the alleged short landing of some military equipment. The suit had been decreed and the defendant shipping company had come up in appeal before the High Court of Kerala challenging the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Cochin. The plaint disclosed the name of the vessel in which the cargo was carried and owned by the defendant M/s. India Steam Ship Company as MV Indian Grace.
The initial feeling that possessed me on reading the name MV Indian Grace was more that of a cheeky little surprise. What kind of coincidence could it be that there is another vessel bearing the same name as the legendary Indian Grace. I proceeded find out by reading through the dusty and worn out bunch of documents in the bundle. There was nothing in them connecting it to the House of Lords decision in the classic English case of MV Indian Grace. It spoke nothing about action in rem or action in personam and it related only to a simple suit for damages filed in the Subordinate judge’s court of Cochin.  So this could never possibly be the same ship MV Indian Grace about which every student of maritime law across the world is taught.
Later that day, I consulted my colleagues at the firm and asked them about the dirty bundle. All that they knew about it was that it is an old file that had been lying there since years and that the every time the matter came up for hearing, it was being adjourned by the Government Pleader. None of them knew about MV Indian Grace and the strange similarity that the subject vessel in the file bore to the land mark decision.  
As I had by then forgotten the specifics of the House of Lords judgment in MV Indian Grace, I decided to consult Christopher Hill the acclaimed author of “Maritime Law”. What I read left me startled. This is what he had to say on MV Indian Grace:
 “A case on the point is the Indian Grace (1998)1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1 HL. The plaintiff cargo owners brought proceedings against the owners in the Court of Cochin and then brought an action in rem in England. Subsequently judgment was delivered in Cochin. In due course owners submitted to the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court. The plaintiffs threatened to arrest the vessel and security was provided. The issue was whether the England action in rem was ‘between the same parties or then privies’ within the meaning of sec. 34 as the action in which the plaintiffs obtained judgment in Cochin. When English action in rem was launched no judgment in personam in Cochin had yet been obtained; .....The English action was struck off. The case has been criticised by leading authors.” 
So the bundle in my hand was the appeal from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge’s court Cochin, which had been relied on by the House of Lords to strike off the English action. Issues in MV Indian Grace were thus still alive and kicking. The thrill that I experienced cannot be described in words. Here I had that once in a life time opportunity of pursuing further a case of classic genre. I set to task at once.
I rushed to the only place in the entire State which then had the Lloyd’s Law Reports, the most authoritative law reports on shipping cases from across the common law world, viz., the library of old High Court of Kerala at the Ram Mohan Palace. I knew from my daily visits, the exact place where the Lloyd’s Law Reports were stacked. No one came to that part of the library and the Lloyd’s Law Reports starting from 1918 to date remained neatly stacked in undisturbed slumber since ages. The book rack had by its side a window and one could stack books on its side, sit next to it and read. There was no electric fan over head but the gentle breeze that comes in once in a while through the window made reading there a pleasurable experience. For weeks, I spent all my afternoons perched on that window reading through the reports, ofcourse starting with the House Lords decision in Indian Grace.
The appeal to be argued before the High Court of Kerala though arising out of same facts was different from the legal issues considered by the House of Lords. Factual aspects as brought out during trial at Cochin assumed more relevance in the appeal. Comparing and confirming the factual observations in the judgment of the House Lords with the documents available in my bundle became by favourite enjoyment. The fire on board and the valiant efforts by the Master to put off the fire risking his life were all revealed from the documents. That the fire was not due to the actual fault or privity of the carrier and that the carrier was entitled to rely on the exception in the bill of lading was very evident.
The decision of the House Lords in MV Indian Grace had deeply affected the features of the in rem action till then exercised by English Courts. It was so important a land mark that, authors identified the different phases of legal growth by terming them as period before MV Indian Grace and after MV Indian Grace. Higher courts across the Common law world took note and relied on the decision in MV Indian Grace. Acknowledged experts on Maritime Law like A.M. Sheppard opined in their treatises that the decision was capable of drastically affecting some features of the action in rem followed in England till then. Since the House of Lords had relied on the Judgment of the Subordinate Judges Court Cochin in striking off the English action, the correctness of the said Judgment of the Sub court to be considered by the Kerala High Court in the appeal assumed relevance.
To my excitement the appeal was finally posted for consideration before a division Bench of the High Court of Kerala. After a fair share of adjournments from the part of the Government, the matter was taken up for final hearing and disposal. The senior presiding Judge being a former Civil Lawyer of standing and repute picked up the relevant facts deftly. The appeal was heard for days together. After noons were specifically set apart for exclusive hearing of the appeal. Carriers liability and intricacies of the term “actual fault and privity of the carrier” were considered by the Judges in detail. Scores of reports on the point from Lloyds Law Reports were placed before the bench by both sides. The response from the Bench was encouraging. It appeared that the Bench was convinced about the protections that the carrier and the vessel are entitled to under law. An important Judgment as a sequel to that of the House of Lords was in the immediate offing.
But before the Judgment could be rendered, to my dismay, the appeal was transferred to another Division Bench. We were back to square one. The presiding Judge here was a seasoned lawyer well aware of commercial legal practise. The Bench echoed the views of the earlier bench. Hearing went on for days. It would start off with a quip by the Judge, “Lets sail with Indian Grace.” Both sides argued in detail. Senior lawyer in the rank of Assistant Solicitor General of India appeared and argued for the Government. The Judge gave a peek of his mind by opining that the precedents and facts called for interference with the judgment of the sub-court. After days of lengthy hearing the new Division Bench proceeded to reserve the matter of dictation. We eagerly awaited a judgment capable of reporting across the maritime world from Kerala High Court, one that would be taken note of by English Lawyers and maritime experts. 
But MV Indian Grace was not destined to have a smooth legal journey. Before the date on which the judgment was to be delivered, the case was posted before the Bench by a process called ‘to be spoken to’. It was submitted on behalf of the Government of India that an amendment is proposed to be moved to hike the claim amount which at present was only for the short landed cargo. The Attorney General of India had in view of the failure of the English action, apparently suggested claiming a constructive total loss of the entire cargo and thus to enhance the claim amount from few lakhs to crores of Rupees. The rendering of judgment was thus sought to be adjourned to facilitate the filing of the amendment petition and the same was allowed. I had no reason to feel alarmed as the earlier two division Benches had been convinced of the case and was eager to render a detailed judgment touching upon all aspects of the case.
Within a week the appeal came up before another division bench.  The suggested amendment had not yet been carried and instead of seeking time for pursuing the same, the Government pressed for urgent hearing before the new bench. The hearing of MV Indian Grace thus commenced before the third division bench. Suffice to say that the Bench wound up the hearing within twenty five minutes and proceeded to deliver judgment dismissing the appeal.
Winning the appeal though was a prime objective was not the sole objective.  All through the hearing the single minded and earnest desire was that the judgment from the High Court of Kerala based on the detailed arguments placed by both sides touching on importance question of maritime law and carriage of goods by sea would lead to a judgment that will be a befitting sequel to the decision of the House of Lords in MV Indian Grace. The judgment that was finally rendered ran to less than four pages and carried a sentence to the effect that though numerous foreign decisions were placed before the Bench the same are not felt relevant to be discussed. Thus ended the long journey of MV Indian Grace.
I returned to office carrying the bundle which had now become huge with numerous copies of decisions from Lloyds reports.  I was visited by my senior partner with a comforting smile. He shared with me the wisest advice which I treasure all through the rest of my career. First one was “Never identify personally with the subject matter of your case however interesting it may be.” This was followed by a very practical advise which went like this. “When a case that had been heard at length by a Bench and is expected to be decided in your favour is sought to be adjourned by the opposite side, pray to the court that the same may be noted on file as PART HEARD.” This would have ensured that the matter would again come up only before the same Bench!
I realised that my theoretical knowledge of maritime law and my rummaging through volumes of Lloyds Law reports are no substitute to practical lawyering skills which can be acquired only through years of patient dedicated practise.
 Let me leave you with a sequel to this story. Around ten years after the above experience, at a private function I ran into the same Judge who had heard the MV Indian Grace appeal on its second round. He had since retired and to my surprise very well remembered the quip of sailing with Indian Grace. He told me that he had already dictated a detailed Judgment allowing the appeal filed by MV Indian Grace and same was not typed out and issued since the matter got adjourned.
                                                           ***

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

New directions in Admiralty Jurisdiction in Kerala – Recent change in law pursuant to the judgment in MV FREE NEPTUNE case.

(By Adv. V.M. Syam Kumar-Lecturer for Maritime Law, National University for Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi.)
When a Judge proceeds to fill in a legal lacuna, there are some inherent limitations which he may have to encounter. He may be able to legislate to a limited extent within the interstices but not beyond that. If he attempts to proceed past the threshold, he may flounder. Nevertheless, the eagerness to render justice may entice him to walk that extra mile.
The case of MV FREE NEPTUNE v. D.L.F. SOUTHERN TOWNS PVT. LTD. [2011 (1) KLT 904] is a typical example of a Judgment where a Court earnestly grapples with a pressing issue, intending to set the law straight but finds itself seriously limited and tied down on to many counts. The said Judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala has altered the procedure regarding invocation and exercise of admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court. A new procedure has been laid down by the Hon’ble Division Bench which is to hereinafter govern the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction in the High Court of Kerala until specific Admiralty Rules are framed by the High Court.
The Judgment requires close study since it contains certain areas of genuine concern for the maritime circles especially in the port city of Cochin which has the only International Transshipment Terminal in India.
The case involved a vessel by the name MV FREE NEPTUNE. While she was berthed in the Port of Chennai, State of Tamil Nadu the High Court of Kerala in a motion alleging short landing of cargo at Cochin arrested her. The vessel thus situated beyond the territorial limits of the High Court of Kerala was arrested by a single judge of the Hon’ble High Court vide an interim Order. The said Interim Order also provided for release of the vessel upon furnishing stipulated security, which was duly furnished by the vessel and release was obtained. Subsequent thereto, the alleged short landed cargo which had been discharged in Chennai was transported to Cochin and the vessel moved for return of the security already furnished. The Learned Single judge refused to order return of security. An amendment motion and a prayer for impleading additional parties were duly allowed by the Learned Single Judge. Appeals were preferred before the Hon’ble Division Bench against the orders of the Learned Single Judge by concerned interests. The Division Bench seized the opportunity which thus presented to itself before it and proceeded to structure the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in Kerala as could be discerned from the following observation in the Division Bench Judgment:
“It may be stated here that there is no statute or any other instrument known to law structuring the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala. No rules are framed by this Court regarding the regulation of the admiralty proceedings before this Court. It is in the said back ground, we thought it fit to withdraw the Sp.J.C. also for a comprehensive examination of these various issues for the purpose of not adjudicating the questions involved in the Sp.J.C., but for the purpose of settling the ambit of the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court and the procedure to be followed in exercising such jurisdiction.”
The Hon’ble Court thus proceeded to settle the ambit of the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala and also to lay down the procedure to be followed for exercising admiralty jurisdiction.
As pointed out in the first part of this article, there was of course a pressing need for structuring and refining the admiralty jurisdiction as exercised by the High Court of Kerala. That the Division Bench attempted to do so was salutary. The Judges had intended to iron out the crevices and brightening the grey areas surrounding the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in Cochin. Thus even though the Judgment started of well with a salutary objective, what finally resulted was something akin to the proverbial throwing of the baby out along with the bath water. Suffice to say that subsequent to the said Judgment, moving the High Court of Kerala to obtain an arrest of a foreign vessel has become onerous for genuine litigants.
It is doubtful whether the choice of Free Neptune as the case to lay down the law relating to admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala was correct in the first place. The motion for seeking to arrest the vessel Free Neptune, which during the relevant time was lying in the Port of Chennai in the State of Tamil Nadu beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala was fit to be dismissed at the threshold by simply following the precedent laid down by the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala itself in the Judgment of Ocean Lanka Shipping Co (Pvt.) Ltd. v MV Janate [1997(1) KLT 369]. The said Judgment had already laid down the law regarding the jurisdictional limit for exercise of admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala. In the said case, the Hon’ble Court had refused to arrest a vessel lying in Mangalore in the state of Karnataka stating that the vessel is not anchored within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala. Thus it is doubtful whether the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala, the jurisdictional limits of which are specifically confined to the state of Kerala and the Union Territory of Lakshadweep had territorial jurisdiction to arrest Free Neptune lying in Chennai Port. The vessel was clearly within the admiralty jurisdictional limits of the High Court of Madras which is a chartered High Court and had all power to invoke its jurisdiction over it. The question of territorial jurisdiction which ought to be the starting point of any adjudication was not dwelt upon and the precedent laid down by Ocean Lanka Shipping Co. was not referred to. Judgments of the High Court of Bombay in Kamala Kant Dube v. M.V. Umang and the High Court of Madras in M/s Seawaves Shipping Services v. M/s Adriatic Tankers and Mayar HK Ltd. v. M.V. Neetu ought to have been considered in the said respect. It has been held by a Division Bench in Reena Padhi v. Owners of Motor Vessel Jagdhir [AIR 1982 Orissa 57] as follows: “It cannot be said that all High Courts in India exercising admiralty jurisdiction have concurrent powers to entertain causes of action….” In Shipping Fund Development Committee v. M.V. Charisma [AIR 1981 BOMBAY 42] the learned judge stated as follows: “It would seem that consequent upon the enactment of the 1958 Act, the admiralty Court has lost its country wide jurisdiction to entertain suits to enforce ship mortgages and retains it only within the limits of particular courts appellate jurisdiction….” Had those aspects been taken note of, it is doubtful whether the Learned Judges would have chosen the case of Free Neptune as the fit case to structure and lay down the law regarding admiralty jurisdiction in Kerala.
How does the Free Neptune Judgment affect different sections of the maritime community in Cochin? The judgment cuts both ways. But it hits the cargo interests harder. Cargo interests from Cochin like sea food exporters who suffer loss due to negligent carriage will find it cumbersome to initiate legal action in Cochin, their home town, for recovery against the erring foreign vessel. They now have to deposit court fee commensurate to their plaint claim, which of course cannot be termed as unfair, but commercial prudence will compel them to travel to Mumbai and initiate a litigation in the High Court of Bombay, though it is an unknown turf infamous for back log of cases, merely because the court fee payable there would be substantially less than what they may have to pay in Kerala. Even when offending vessel is found berthed right in Cochin, the litigants would thus rush to Bombay for moving the Admiralty Court finally to no avail since there is every chance that by the time an arrest order is obtained from Bombay High Court, the vessel sailed out to her next port of call out of India. The judgment in its effect would not spare the Ship or its owners/charterers either. Though the Judgment has the obvious beneficial side that frivolous arrest of vessels at the drop of a hat would be averted, since the arrest when it actually comes would come from Mumbai and other Chartered High Courts outside Kerala possibly from Calcutta too, for obtaining release of the vessels they may have to move the very same Courts.
The felt necessity of the trade was only to prevent frivolous arrests by plugging the lacunae in law regarding exercise of admiralty jurisdiction by the High Court of Kerala. All that was needed was some norms which would prevent the misuse and wrongful invocation of admiralty jurisdiction. It could have been achieved by a much simpler process than by rocking the proverbial boat and ultimately leading to its capsizing.
A motion for arrest of a foreign vessel is made for the limited purpose of ensuring that the vessel does not slip out of the territorial jurisdiction without providing sufficient security before the dispute is adjudicated and final decision is arrived at. At the time when the arrest motion is made, the claim would be in a nascent stage. It is not necessary that the vessel should continue to remain within the territorial jurisdiction while the claim is adjudicated on its merits. The vessel could sail off after providing a security so that the dispute can be adjudicated at leisure. The security thus furnished would be kept alive till the final culmination of the claim in a Judgment/Decree or an Award. The claim may have been either allowed or dismissed. If the same is allowed, fully or partially, the same could be realized from the security provided. This being the limited objective of filing an arrest motion invoking admiralty jurisdiction, couldn’t this have been easily achieved by the structuring exists norms?
High Court of Kerala does not have Original Civil Jurisdiction. But the Hon’ble Division Bench has in Free Neptune Judgment laid down the law to be followed in the future as follows:
“This Court did not so far frame any Rules regulating the procedure for adjudicating the disputes arising under the admiralty jurisdiction. Therefore we deem is appropriate to declare that henceforth any person approaching this court invoking the admiralty jurisdiction shall institute a suit in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Such suits shall be tried by this Court following the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure.”
In view of the above law now laid down by the Hon’ble Court, any one who herein after chooses to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala, will have to do so by instituting a civil suit. Some interesting situations could arise. Since according to the dictum filing of civil suits are necessary only in case of invocation of “admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala”, in Socratic sense we may have to define our terms at the threshold. What exactly is the scope and ambit of the term “admiralty jurisdiction”? We are readily assisted by the definition as laid down in Section 20 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 (which is a statute of United Kingdom and has engaged the attention of the Learned Judge’s as revealed from para 19 of the Free Neptune Judgment). Sec.20 of the said Act states that Admiralty Jurisdiction of the High Court shall include the Jurisdiction to hear and determine any questions and claims mentioned in sub clause (2) of the Act. The said sub-clause (2) enumerates under (a) to (s) the questions and claims. Sub-clause 2 (e), (g) and (h) are of direct interest. (e) speaks of any claim for damage done by a ship, (g) any claim for loss or damage to goods carried in a ship, and (h) any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship. [Sub clause (f) also would assume relevance depending on whether the term “Personal Injury” used therein is wide enough to take in an injury/loss suffered by a cargo owner due to damage or short landing of cargo. Let’s save if for another time].
This definition of Admiralty Jurisdiction of the High Court as laid down in Section 20 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 is in pari materia with the definition of “Maritime claim” in the 1952 Brussels Convention on Arrest of Ships.
What follows is that since the Learned Judges have in Free Neptune laid down a law that hereinafter all motions invoking the ‘admiralty jurisdiction’ of the High Court of Kerala shall be civil suits, and since the term ‘admiralty jurisdiction’ as examined above herein above takes in ‘any claim for damage done by a ship’, ‘any claim for loss or damage to goods carried in a ship’, and ‘any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship’, it may be open to file suits for realizing said claims before the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala invoking its admiralty jurisdiction. Strangely enough, small civil suits for such paltry sums as Rs.50,000/- which hitherto were filed in the Subordinate Judges Court, Cochin could possibly be filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala invoking its admiralty jurisdiction. Whether it’s desirable that the Highest Court of the land, which since its inception has not handled civil suits and is insufficiently equipped (administratively) for handling prolonged civil trials involving complex maritime legal issues, should now commence adjudicating such cases is a question to be pondered on.
Moreover, is it necessary for the Hon’ble High Court to relegate to itself all suits involving maritime claims? Even more so since all suits pertaining to maritime claims need not necessarily contain a relief for arresting a foreign vessel and could simply be a suit for money arising out of a carriage of goods by sea contract. Thus all maritime claims need not lead to invocation of admiralty jurisdiction in the sense of arresting the defaulting ship. Such maritime claims which are pure and simple civil suits could as well be adjudicated by the Subordinate Judge’s Court as is presently being done, the said courts being well equipped to deal with such complex questions requiring appreciation of evidence in detail.
The validity of the direction in Free Neptune that “Such suits shall be tried by this Court following the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure.” has also to be examined in the context of Sec. 112 of the C.P.C. which is a saving provision which lays down that “Nothing herein contained applies to any matter of …admiralty or vice-admiralty jurisdiction ….”
Another equally interesting situation looms large due to the said laying down of law in Free Neptune. It relates to Sec. 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. The said provision too has engaged the attention of the learned Judges while rendering Free Neptune Judgment as can be revealed from para 20. Sec. 443 speaks about detention of a foreign vessel while within Indian Jurisdiction. The difference between ‘Arrest’ and ‘Detention’ of a ship assumes significance here. Arrest practically and theoretically is graver than Detention. Detention is a condition which the ship endures more than frequently during her life. It is less rigorous from Arrest, both in cause and effect. A detailed exposition of the difference may be out of place here, suffice to say in the context of Sec.443 that the term Arrest has been purposefully excluded by the Legislature in Secs. 443 and 444 of the Act. Instead it only speaks of detention. A co-joint reading of the said two sections will reveal that power of detention exists both in the High Court as well as on an officer of the port (albeit temporarily). Thus detention is a power evidently different from Arrest which as is said to exist only in the Highest Courts of Record having plenary power. An officer of the port may not be able to arrest a ship though he could detain it on various grounds one of which could be as explained in Sec.443 (2). The Hon’ble Supreme Court also while discussing powers under 443 and 444 termed them as merely procedural and substantive rights like that of Arrest lies else where. Coming back again to Free Neptune judgment lets examine how the dictum therein that civil suits alone could be filed invoking admiralty action, impact Secs. 443 and 444 of Merchant Shipping Act, 1958? A motion under Sec.443 to the High Court will have all the draping of and resemblances to a ‘maritime claim’ and to an ‘admiralty action’. It will for sure involve a foreign ship which might have caused damage to or loss to the cargo of an Indian citizen and the claim could lead to a claim over the vessel herself. Sec. 443 does not state that a civil suit has to be preferred for invoking the procedure laid down therein. If he moves the High Court purporting to invoke 443 he ought not be compelled to file a civil suit stating that his motion has all draping of invocation of admiralty jurisdiction. By all means the procedure laid down under Sec.443 for moving the High Court was a special jurisdiction conferred on the High Court. It was made part of the statute in 1958, at a time when admiralty jurisdiction and arrest was being exercised by the chartered High Courts in India. It was thus a procedural right available to an Indian Citizen against a foreign ship in addition to the right of arrest which he may have had under general law. The nomenclature Special Jurisdiction Case (Sp.J.C.) hitherto followed by the Registry of the High Court of Kerala while numbering motions made under Sec. 443 was thus apt and correct. The right vested in an Indian Citizen under Sec.443 of the Act to seek detention (not arrest) by moving the High Court will be effectively curtailed if his remedy to seek enforcement thereof could be invoked only by way of filing a civil suit as now seen laid down in Free Neptune. The situation will be even direr if the officer contemplated under Sec. 443 (2) refuses to exercise his power to detain the vessel notwithstanding existence of all prerequisites for such detention and a motion seeking mandamus is resisted contending that only suit is maintainable in the facts of the case. In effect, does the Judgment in Free Neptune exclude from its ambit motions under Sec.443? Can a writ or a Sp.J.C still lie to the High Court under Sec.443? The problems arising from the interplay of the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act conferring jurisdiction on the High Court and the inherent powers of the High Court can be well gauged from the decision in Shipping Fund Development Committee v. M.V. Charisma [AIR 1981 BOMBAY 42].
In Free Neptune, after thus laying down the procedure to be followed for invoking the admiralty jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Court proceeded to lay down the law applicable till proper Rules are framed by the High Court. “We also declare that Rules framed by the Madras High Court in so far as they are not inconsistent with any other provision of law for the time being in force and with appropriate modifications shall apply to the conduct of such suits until this Court modifies the said Rules or the legislature intervenes in this regard.”
The choice of the Madras Rules as applicable during the interregnum was explained by the Hon’ble Court as follows: “ We make such a declaration not only because we owe an obligation under law to devise a procedure for the regulations of the proceedings before this Court as was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Elisabeth’s case at para 64… but also for the reason that a part of the territory over which this High Court now exercise jurisdiction was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court prior to the States Reorganization Act, 1956. Therefore, for at least that part of the territory of the State of Kerala, which was within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court prior to the States Reorganization Act, 1956 was governed by the law administered by the Madras High Court which devolved upon this Court by virtue of the operation of Section 52 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956.”
Since the Hon’ble Court was involved in the very crucial exercise of devising a procedure for the regulations of the proceedings before itself, a closer scrutiny would have been desirable. Cue could have been taken from the detailed exposition regarding similar question of admiralty jurisdiction of Orissa High Court in Reena Padhi v. Owners of Motor Vessel Jagdhir [AIR 1982 Orissa 57].
Moreover the reliance placed on and interpretation given to Sec. 52 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956 to justify the adoption of Madras Rules is not free from doubt. Erstwhile Malabar district which was an administrative district of former Madras Presidency is now part of Kerala state. But all along the west coast of India including over the erstwhile Malabar district, High Court of Bombay as a colonial court of admiralty had exercised admiralty jurisdiction especially since the old chartered high courts has been exercising overlapping admiralty jurisdiction. Even offlate the High Court of Bombay has been arresting ships berthed in Chennai. Since the law as applicable along the west coast including Malabar and the entire coast of Kerala, was the admiralty law as enforced by the High Court of Bombay, the more appropriate course of action to be adopted during the interregnum would have been to apply the Admiralty Rules of Bombay as it was ‘the law in force’ over that part of the state of Kerala ‘immediately before the appointed day’ as envisaged Sec. 52 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956.
Arrest of a vessel invoking admiralty jurisdiction is an action in rem. It is an action against a res or a thing and against unascertained persons, i.e., against the world at large, thus binding any one who has a real and subsisting interest in the res. All that is necessary is to retain the power of the High Court to entertain an action in rem thus retaining the power of the High Court to entertain an arrest motion under admiralty jurisdiction and to structure and refine its exercise. It is desirable that the inherent admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in a motion in rem is confined to arrest of the relevant vessel found within its jurisdiction and upon furnishing of security by the person interested in the vessel, the action in rem thus being converted to an action in personam, the parties ought to be relegated back to the appropriate forum to fight out their action in personam by way of a suit or arbitration during the pendancy of which the security furnished should be kept alive. The system in place in High Court of Kerala before the Free Neptune judgment had effectively ensured the above. The simplest and most ideal course which the Hon’ble Court could have adopted in the case of Free Neptune case was to affirm the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala to arrest a vessel in an action in rem (though already well crystallized after MV Elizabeth thus requiring no affirmation) and to relegate the parties to the appropriate forum to fight out their action in personam. The whole exercise of directing the file a civil suit and to import Madras Rules to Cochin could have been avoided.
The need for retaining a special jurisdiction as Admiralty Jurisdiction is itself debatable. However, accepting the peculiar nature of maritime transactions and assuming that there is a need for treating them separately (see Sec. 112 of the CPC), are there any compelling reasons for the highest court of the state, already over burdened with litigations, to proceed to consider civil suits involving complex commercial questions of maritime law and facts which would require elaborate appreciation of evidence.
The judgment in Free Neptune case points out to the urgent need for a comprehensive legislation regarding admiralty law in India. It can be reasonably discerned from the slow death of the Admiralty Bill, 2005 that such a wait could be a fairly long one. Till then the only solution to the impasse appears to be adoption of comprehensive Admiralty Rules by the High Court of Kerala. The Admiralty Rules in force in Madras, Bombay or Calcutta have all become thoroughly outdated and needs fine tuning to meet the felt necessities of time and trade. A verbatim adoption or transplanting of any of such Rules as the Rules for the High Court of Kerala would only complicate things further since the very character of the said courts and the Kerala High Court are different. Being the only International Transshipment Terminal in India undertaking maritime activity of a unique nature, let’s hope that the Admiralty Rules to be evolved by the High Court would take note of the felt necessities of international trade as pointed out by the Supreme Court in MV Elizabeth case and noted with approval by the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in the case of Free Neptune.
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